On 6/4/12 7:43 PM, Sebastian G. <bastik.tor> wrote: > Karsten Loesing: >> On 5/16/12 8:47 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote: >>> On 5/2/12 2:30 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: >>>> If nobody objects within the next, say, two weeks, I'm going to make an >>>> old tarball from 2008 available with original nicknames. And if nobody >>>> screams, I'll provide the remaining tarballs containing original >>>> nicknames another two weeks later. >>> >>> Here we go. These are the sanitized bridge descriptors from May 2008 >>> including original bridge nicknames: >>> >>> http://freehaven.net/~karsten/volatile/bridges-2008-05-nicknames.tar.bz2 >> >> And now, two weeks later, here are the sanitized bridge descriptors >> containing nicknames: >> >> https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html#bridgedesc >> >> Best, >> Karsten > > Here are my findings for the tarballs of March 2012. I could pick freely > from any 2012 tarball. I picked March 2012 because it contained the > "bridge peak" and the relays seemed stable.
Results are that 205 of your 308 guesses (66%) were correct in the sense that a bridge was at least once running in the same /24 as the relay with similar nickname. At any time in March 2012, you'd have located between 26 and 46 bridges (1.7% to 3.3%) with 37 bridges (2.5%) in the mean via nickname similarity. Your accuracy went up from 30% in your May 2008 analysis to 66%, but the overall fraction of bridges you'd have located went down from 10% to 2.5% in the mean. I think we can live with an adversary being able to locate 1 out of 40 bridges if the operator assigns a similar nickname and runs it on a nearby IP address. If you think you can come up with a vastly improved rate of located bridges of, say, 5% or more, I can look at another findings.txt of yours for a different month than March 2012. If not, let's conclude this analysis and assume that publishing bridge nicknames is safe enough---until somebody shows us that we're wrong. Again, thanks for running this analysis! Thanks, Karsten _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
