-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 07/17/2012 10:08 PM, Isis wrote: > On Mon 16 Jul 2012 at 02:15, thus spake Ondrej Mikle: >> On 07/15/2012 02:56 PM, Arturo Filastò wrote: >>> >>> # What properties we would like it to have note: these are not >>> ordered. * Efficient even over high latency networks. * Ease of >>> integration for third party developers. * Expandable to support >>> requirements of new tests we develop. * Anonymous * Secure > >> Even though you will probably not end up using this, it may be a good >> idea to know that it exists: > >> ZeroC Ice - http://www.zeroc.com/ice.html [...] > > Oh man. It's not Twisted, that's for sure. :) > > Though, it seems that much of Ice is redundant if we are already packaging > Twisted. Perhaps we could use their code as reference, and just write out > the methods we need in Twisted to avoid the extra dependency?
If you are packaging/using Twisted, then yes, Ice is redundant (unless someone planned to differentiate "signaling" from "data" protocol, for example). >> It can optionally use TLS, interface definition for RPC and structures >> is written only once (each language binding then loads it and maps it to >> native object of its own as "usual" method calls or attributes). > >> Advanced features include asynchronous calls, at-most-once semantics (it >> can retry RPC call for methods that are marked "idempotent", i.e. whose >> multiple invocation is same as one invocation), persistence via Ice >> Freeze (might work for the file storage, not sure how big are your files, >> internally it's implemented on top of BerkeleyDB), forward/backward >> compatibility among versions of your API (up to a limit)... > > Becoming more convinced. Do you know off the top of your head which > protocol it uses? HTTP also, I would assume? At low-level, it has its own protocol, it's not HTTP (it actually won't work over HTTP). > Side note: What are we going to do for countries which block/monitor/MITM > SSL connections? If I'm not mistaken, hasn't it been the case that these > places have still allowed ssh? Should we have some sort of append-only > scp-like fallback? Does Ice have that? Unfortunately, there's no fallback in Ice for that (its firewall-evading also uses SSL/TLS which is not useful here). Maybe I misunderstood Arturo's requirement that said TLS or TorHS was considered for encrypted/authenticated transport. Ondrej -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQB0TbAAoJEAy6xNgMZCEgyVUIAKpcZjXVqaxDFmtyYUlyonv8 snXCsW0IX93ywpP63SIpleTPAl3Yp4T7Ng6wZKjpMJ/N2xEo7o5GGHl9Z2YVnUyY Kgp6/FZPkHZv0PmDSVKANleJPTP+CR4LemkcezLiMnpSQ7kv7mIXpVsKbgTJ9B5L AFa/mWj/YCAJT8I108pteCLZDFEaDEdciM5Bl4Kp6hoiiouyDPRjF2/fC/YWVTfL DBmo6m8Wq3ZemlLW3At5dvYOct9gQgYyZgq8DWXVFzKx0JzfQ1rXoO4ovZFoLh7D fnVtjjSaWMOHhscdIS4zx5x9Q4J4QQtwyK0pKBnZwq6DF1J2FPuMxg/jP4v+UrE= =31rD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
