Symmetric cryptography (AES et al) key length - the 128, 256 etc bits you are talking about - is not directly comparable to public/private key cryptography, specifically RSA in this case. 1024 bits was considered a good strong RSA key... in 1995.
On Fri, May 17, 2013, at 08:29 AM, David Vorick wrote: Why are so many bits necessary? Isn't 128bits technically safe against brute force? At 256 bits you are pretty much safe from any volume of computational power that one could fathom within this century. The only real danger is a new computational model that is nondeterministic or something crazy like that. I feel like what exists currently (from a quantity of bits standpoint) is more than sufficient. On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 11:09 AM, adrelanos <[1][email protected]> wrote: George Kadianakis: > Thoughts? Can you make .onion domains really long and therefor really safe against brute force? Or have an option for maximum key length and a weaker default if common CPU's are still too slow? I mean, if you want to make 2048 bit keys the default because you feel most hidden services have CPU's which are too slow for 4096 bit keys, then use 2048 bit as default with an option to use the max. of 4096 bit. Bonus point: Can you make the new implementation support less painful updates (anyone or everyone) when the next update will be required? (forward compatibility) _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [2][email protected] [3]https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [4][email protected] [5]https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev Sent from my device References 1. mailto:[email protected] 2. mailto:[email protected] 3. https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev 4. mailto:[email protected] 5. https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
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