On Fri, May 24, 2013 at 12:32:20AM -0400, Jon Smithe wrote: > Hi, > > > As for the deanonymization attack, I think it is pretty novel in that it > > uses a custom traffic signature to make the attack from > > http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/hs-attack06.pdf more reliable, but > > otherwise that is why we introduced guard nodes. > > The math behind this concept is not overly compelling or I'm just > dumb, both are probable and neither are mutually exclusive, but if I > were looking for a state-based backdoor, I'd imagine it to look a bit > like this (which is not to imply that is the case here by any means). > > Jon
Hi Jon! You make some interesting and valid points, however this is the type of statement that spreads fud and it doesn't help anyone. Please see bug #8240 [0] which contains a detailed discussion of this topic. tl;dr This is being worked on, 0.2.4 addresses many of these problems and 0.2.5 will continue to make improvments. Whether or not you were implying this situation was a calculated decision that resulted in a "state-based backdoor", it is the insinuation of such a thing that can hurt Tor's reputation. - Matt [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8240 _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
