On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 07:38:44PM +0200, ra wrote: > Hello everyone! > > During this year's Google Summer of Code I[0] will be working on reducing the > Round-Trip-Time (RTT) for preemptively built circuits.[1] My mentors are Mike > and Aaron. > > A brief summary of the project: > RTTs of circuits can be measured by violating the exit policy of the exit > node > and the resulting error can be timed in a measuring client. It is assumed > that > the RTTs are Fréchet-distributed which could be used to reject a preemptively > built circuit if its RTT is below a certain threshold value. > A basic algorithm will be implemented to gather the required data for further > statistical analysis which should help answering open questions like: > • Are the RTTs Fréchet-distributed? > • Does this strategy make new attacks feasible? > • How many probes per circuit are needed to do reasonable estimations? > • How much additional load is added to the network? > • What is an appropriate cut-off percentile? > • Does the strategy work in terms of anonymity and performance? > • Does the RTT vary for destination ports? (This might be the case for > destination ports that occur rarely in exit policies.) > • Does this strategy also work if guard nodes are congested? > > Best, > Robert > > [0] "ra_" on OFTC > [1] http://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/project/google/gsoc2013/ra_/19001
Robert, If I'm understanding the above correctly, this sounds related to our congestion-aware path selection work: http://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/Congestion_Aware_FC12.pdf http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2011/cacr2011-20.pdf It's not exactly the same, but I just wanted to ensure you were aware of it. [Cc: Tao Wang, the lead author on that paper.] Thanks, - Ian _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
