> I'm posting the draft of a proposal that specifies how to hide HS > descriptors and addresses from the hidden service directories. >... > HSDirs could still learn the address of the HSes by logging the client > directory requests (which contain the hidden service address). >... > Currently, Hidden Services upload their unencrypted descriptor to > hidden service directories (HSDirs). HSDirs store the unencrypted > descriptor in an internal map of: <hs address> -> <hs descriptor> > When a client wants the descriptor of an HS, it asks an HSDir for > the descriptor that corresponds to <hs address>. If the HSDir has > such an index in its map, it returns the <hs descriptor> to the > client.
It is known there is a de-anon paper regarding HS, that is a separate weakness. But the above words about HSDirs having plaintext access to any plaintext or decodeable '.onion' string (whether via the descriptor or request argument) is, as far as I know in current operation, being consistently and badly misdated, to the point of causing confusion, even in the above paper. In current rend-spec.txt we have Sec 1.3, v2 descriptors are used post 0.2.2.1-alpha, specifically... descriptor-id = H(permanent-id | H(time-period | descriptor-cookie | replica)) ??? _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
