In that case would it then look like zero in $(organizational unit of harvard) using tor and one in $(organizational unit of harvard) using scramble suit?
I like the idea of the tor pluggable transport combiner... wherein we could wrap a pseudo-random appearing obfuscation protocol (such as obfs3, scramblesuit etc) in a white listed obfuscation protocol such as http?, sshrproxy, hexchat etc. I imagine the anonymity set would be much smaller for these combined transports... fewer people using them. On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Matthew Finkel <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote: >> Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation? >> For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously - >> capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to >> maintain the data rates > > The very quick answer without providing much detail is that you may want > to look at scramblesuit [0][1]. It doesn't try to provide constant > throughput, but (as the website says) "we alter inter-arrival times and > the transported protocol's packet length distribution". This isn't a > perfect solution, and won't impress a GPA, but it's a start if you're > dealing with a localized passive observer. > > - Matt > > [0] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ > [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/scramblesuit.git > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
