11.07.2014 14:31, Ian Goldberg: > On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote: >> Hey Nick, >> >> this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev >> meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery attacks (#9001). >> (...)
HS stands for hidden-service, if I'm not mistaking. > > And similarly at the exit node: the exit will now know that circuits > coming from the same middle are more likely to be the same client. > That's a little more worrying to me than the above. > If the proposed change applies to hidden-services alone, "regular" usage of Tor (Client > Guard > Middle > Exit > Destination) is not affected. My reading was that the middle node for hidden-service connections are kept longer. Could anyone please clarify the proposed change? Regards, Sebastian G. _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
