Michael Rogers <[email protected]> writes: > On 12/07/15 22:48, John Brooks wrote: >> 1.3. Other effects on proposal 224 >> >> An adversarial introduction point is not significantly more capable than a >> hidden service directory under proposal 224. The differences are: >> >> 1. The introduction point maintains a long-lived circuit with the >> service >> 2. The introduction point can break that circuit and cause the service >> to >> rebuild it > > Regarding this second difference: the introduction point (cooperating > with a corrupt middle node) could potentially try to discover the > service's guard by repeatedly breaking the circuit until it was rebuilt > through the corrupt middle node. Would it make sense to use vanguards > here, as well as on rendezvous circuits? >
Hello, currently we address this intro point guard discovery attack by having hidden services retry only 3 times. After those 3 times, they ditch that intro point and pick another one. That said proposal 247 suggests that hidden services use vanguards for both rendezvous and introduction point circuits anyway. Take care! _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
