Apologies for quick post. If we want to a socially connected link, seems we can use the same infrastructure for doing keysignings parties but we just use relay public keys. That seems a nice distributed way of doing this. On Thu, 24 Sep 2015 at 13:42 Virgil Griffith <[email protected]> wrote:
> Can we not use the argument "anonymity requires diverse company" on both > sides? For whole rational actors it seems like this should work. Tor > "exploits the military" into lending cover to activist groups, which they > would presumably support. > > This may be too naive a view of the situation. > > Re: socially connected. That's interesting. I'll see what I can do. Chat > more in Berlin. > > -V > On Thu, 24 Sep 2015 at 13:19 Roger Dingledine <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:18:58AM +0000, Virgil Griffith wrote: >> > Exit nodes seem a nice place to start concretizing what's meant when we >> say >> > we want relay diversity. Comments immensely appreciated because as-is I >> > don't know the answers to these questions. >> >> Hi Virgil, >> >> I've been pondering the opposite of this topic, after looking at the >> recent tor-relays thread about some ISP not wanting to let somebody >> host an exit relay because they figure a lot of the Tor network is >> run by government agencies. My usual answer to that concern is "no, we >> *know* the operators of more than half the capacity in the Tor network, >> so this cannot be the case". And I think this is increasingly true in >> the era of activist non-profits that run relays -- Germany's got one, >> and so do the US, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Luxembourg, etc etc. >> >> But it would be neat to have a mechanism for learning whether this is >> actually true, and (whatever the current situation) how it's changing. >> >> The tie-in to Roster would be some sort of "socially connected" badge, >> which your relay gets because you're sufficiently tied into the Tor >> relay operator community. >> >> And then we'd have something concrete to point to for backing up, or >> disputing, the claim that we know a significant fraction of the network. >> >> Of course, the details of when to assign the badge will be tricky and >> critical: too loose and you undermine the trust in it (it only takes a >> few "omg the kgb runs a relay and look it's got the badge" cases to make >> the news), but too strict and you undercount the social connectedness. >> >> In a sense this is like the original 'valid' flag, which you got >> by mailing me and having me manually approve your relay (and without >> which you would never be used as the entry or exit point in a circuit). >> Periodically I wonder if we should go back to a design like that, where >> users won't pick exit relays that don't have the "socially connected" >> badge. Then I opt against wanting it, since I worry that we'd lose >> exactly the kind of diversity we need most, by cutting out the relays >> whose operators we don't know. >> >> But both sides of that are just guessing. Let's find out! >> >> --Roger >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-dev mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev >> >
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