> Let's use your idea of "if one IP fails and TTL expired then re-fetch". > This could also make it "easier" to identify people connecting to > Facebook. As your client guard, I see you do the fetch + IP/RP dance (3 > circuits in short period of time where two are killed). I wait 2 hours > and then kill all circuits passing through me from you. If I can see > again that distinctive HS pattern (3 circuits), I'll get closer to know > that you are accessing FB.
Would that not happen if and only if (in the meantime) the server had had a server outage impacting the first IP that the client tries reconnecting to? Odds on, the client entry guard will see no measurable change? -a _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
