> On 30 Nov 2015, at 09:13, Nick Mathewson <[email protected]> wrote: > ... > 2.2. New relay cell payload > ... > When encrypting a cell for a hop that was created using one of these > circuits, clients and relays encrypt them using the AEZ algorithm > with the following parameters: > > Let Chain denote chain_val_forward if this is a forward cell > or chain_forward_backward otherwise.
chain_val_backward? > ... > > 3.3. Why _not_ AEZ? > > ... > > THIRD, it's really horrible to try to do it in hardware. This may be considered an advantage against an adversary with the resources to employ custom hardware to attempt to break AEZ-based encryption. > ... > > ... > 4.3. A forward-secure variant. How is this different to what you've specified in the main body of the proposal? > > We might want the property that after every cell, we can forget > some secret that would enable us to decrypt that cell if we saw > it again. > > … Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
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