I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as possible) from Tor's core mechanism.
-V On Wed, 6 Jan 2016 at 21:42 Peter Tonoli <[email protected]> wrote: > Quoting Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <[email protected]>: > > If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then > > running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary. > > I'd argue that it's marginally less attractive. They still have the > opportunity to inspect some unencrypted traffic. > > > And even adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor > Network. > > This could also potentially backfire: adversaries can create local > (non-tor) policies to throttle encrypted exit traffic, while not > throttling unencrypted traffic. > > Peter.. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev >
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