> On 4 Dec. 2016, at 03:05, [email protected] wrote: > > Read the Alpenhorn paper. Really neat stuff. It is able to guarantee > forward-secrecy for identities and metadata and doesn't need out-of-band > identity sharing. Can any of this stuff be borrowed for HSs? > > https://vuvuzela.io/alpenhorn-extended.pdf
There's still out-of-band identify sharing: "does not require out-of-band communication other than knowing the other user’s Alpenhorn username (email address)" They also don't seem to understand how to do onion encryption efficiently: "A naïve approach would be to onion-encrypt a message [but] each layer of encryption adds additional space overhead" And the entire protocol requires trusting at least one of a series of key servers. T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
