On Sat, 22 Sep 2018 at 19:28, Dave Rolek <[email protected]> wrote: > The circID is scoped under a given connection between adjacent nodes. > > A relay node maintains a mapping of circIDs for a circuit - mapping the > forward and backward circID - for traffic it is relaying. > > So for a circuit ... > client <-ID_a-> guard <-ID_b-> middle <-ID_c-> exit > > ... each of the ID_*s are independent, and any node only knows the IDs > immediately "adjacent" to it. Each connection (e.g. each client to that > guard) has a independent enumeration/allocation of IDs.
That is an awesome explanation, thank you ever so much. If I read that right, to the most that an attacker with observability of the Cloudflare IP addresses could get, is either ... ( using the nomenclature from the diagram at https://twitter.com/AlecMuffett/status/926032680055201792 ) 1) correlation backwards to "Server Side Middle 1" for browsing a normal onion over Tor; or... 2) correlation backwards to "Client Side Middle" for browsing a single-hop onion over Tor Am I correct? That latter seems not very much worse than the information which a compromised exit node would be able to obtain ("Browsing Normal Web over Tor") although it would be a lot more available when the circID is presented to the any backbone observer who can sniff IPv6? -a -- > http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
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