https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=17ecd04fde2fd98b0cca3afb251b7173e22d3f42
On 10 December 2014 at 17:57, Logforme <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2014-12-10 08:31, Roger Dingledine wrote: > > Careful with your conclusion there -- because of memory fragmentation, > > the process can still hold the memory even when Tor has freed the memory. > htop currently shows 3622/3858 Mem used and 1545/3136 Swap used. (if I > remember correctly it's usually less than 1000 Mem and 0 Swap used). > So the attacker (intentional or accidental) actually managed to make Tor > take all free memory on the machine before the MaxMemInQueues function > stepped in. And now I have no way to release that memory short of > restarting tor. If I used the machine for something apart from tor it > would have been a successful attack. > Guess I need to set the MaxMemInQueues parameter to something other than > 0, maybe 2GB? What's the "reasonable default" for MaxMemInQueues? Some > percentage of total RAM? > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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