Given the current state of the internet (ie, massive warrantless spying by LEO's and packet inspection by ISP's) I cannot imagine how any TOR operator would block encrypted services and not be what most reasonable people consider a "Bad exit".
On 2015-10-29 14:05, Mike Perry wrote: > Green Dream: > >> Mirimir: aside from the nickname, do you have any reason to believe it was >> out of the ordinary? The exit policy mostly only seems to allow >> non-encrypted services (80 but not 443, 143 > > A while ago we were actively marking nodes that only allowed > non-encrypted services as BadExit, since there were no satisfactory > explanations given as to why nodes should need this policy. > > Back then, the most common explanation people gave was "I need the > ability to block traffic that looks evil." Unfortunately, all mechanisms > available to do this will also end up blocking legitimate content at > some rate. Nobody was using anything more advanced than snort-style > regular expressions that matched things that happened to look like > exploits. > > FWIW, I am personally in favor of reinstating such a policy. I doubt the > situation has changed. > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [1] Links: ------ [1] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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