What happened to "innocent until proven guilty?" While the police could have compromised the relay, we can't assume they did just because they're the police. On Apr 7, 2016 6:42 PM, "Green Dream" <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Of course, but what would they make of it? They might have 200 > > perfectly legitimate Tor nodes already, making a blacklist > > absolutely useless. > > So we should do nothing? This logic makes little sense. The directory > authorities already have blacklist capabilities, and add known malicious > relays to it as the need arises [1]. Sniffing traffic on an exit is a good > enough reason to blacklist a node, as far as I can tell. So if we did know > of government running or monitoring exits for this purpose, it would be > sufficient reason to blacklist. This particular case is perhaps not so > clear cut but I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss the idea of blacklisting. > > 1) The blacklist used to be published here > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays but it's > apparently no longer published. > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > >
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