So exactly why is he unable to kill the process? Even as su ? But also, if this is all taking place, what spook "agency" is doing the install, where a new drive gets the same and spreads? Where did the install iso get downloaded from, and did the hash get checked?

Me

On 05/31/2016 03:16 PM, Greg Moss wrote:

Wow – I’m looking to see if mine has been taken over. How do I find that file below on mine?

*From:*tor-relays [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Percy Blakeney
*Sent:* Tuesday, May 31, 2016 12:07 PM
*To:* [email protected]
*Subject:* Re: [tor-relays] [Fwd: Re: I'm Running A Tor Exit But Never Initiated It]

And this:

# Tor state file last generated on 2016-05-31 14:31:06 local time
# Other times below are in UTC
# You *do not* need to edit this file.

EntryGuard Jans 50586E25BE067FD1F739998550EDDCB1A14CA5B2 DirCache
EntryGuardUnlistedSince 2016-05-31 18:00:11
EntryGuardAddedBy 50586E25BE067FD1F739998550EDDCB1A14CA5B2 0.2.4.27 2016-04-28 16:16:20 EntryGuardPathBias 104.000000 104.000000 100.000000 4.000000 0.000000 0.000000
EntryGuard Unnamed B2CB9E5C80367C9026A806EC4801E22425AA7E8A DirCache
EntryGuardAddedBy B2CB9E5C80367C9026A806EC4801E22425AA7E8A 0.2.4.27 2016-04-20 04:00:54
EntryGuardPathBias 5.000000 4.000000 4.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
EntryGuard Unnamed 1DE193C88576C3B377CEFCDB6E6E8B91F195D252 DirCache
EntryGuardUnlistedSince 2016-05-17 01:51:36
EntryGuardAddedBy 1DE193C88576C3B377CEFCDB6E6E8B91F195D252 0.2.4.27 2016-04-20 10:24:57
EntryGuard CatRelay12 ADE45DA3A6D318FEB07E2E099BCCCFEA8ADAC8DC DirCache
EntryGuardAddedBy ADE45DA3A6D318FEB07E2E099BCCCFEA8ADAC8DC 0.2.4.27 2016-04-22 14:09:45
TorVersion Tor 0.2.4.27 (git-412e3f7dc9c6c01a)
LastWritten 2016-05-31 18:31:06
TotalBuildTimes 108
CircuitBuildTimeBin 325 3
CircuitBuildTimeBin 375 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 425 18
CircuitBuildTimeBin 475 22
CircuitBuildTimeBin 525 9
CircuitBuildTimeBin 575 13
CircuitBuildTimeBin 625 5
CircuitBuildTimeBin 675 8
CircuitBuildTimeBin 725 4
CircuitBuildTimeBin 775 4
CircuitBuildTimeBin 825 4
CircuitBuildTimeBin 875 3
CircuitBuildTimeBin 925 2
CircuitBuildTimeBin 975 2
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1025 3
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1075 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1125 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1175 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1275 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1375 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 1525 1
CircuitBuildTimeBin 2275 1




On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 3:02 PM, Percy Blakeney <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    I'm not offended in the least.  No worries.  The only reason I'm
    contacting anyone about this is the sheer fact Tor folders, files
and connections are running through my systems and connection. Otherwise, I would have kept all of this to myself. Tor is
    extremely important and my fear is that someone out there maybe
    attempting to disguise themselves to enter it.  I'm far from being
    IT savvy, however, I've spent the last six or so months trying to
    read everything I can possibly read to get a better understanding
    as to what's going on.  Now, according to my Dell and Acer which
    both run Mint, when I try to install Tor I'm told I already have
    it.  When I try to run Tor I'm told I don't have it.  When I try
    to remove it, it comes back.  However, I have a Lenovo with
    Windows10 on it.  With that computer I was able to install the Tor
    browser with no problems.  So here I am with one laptop that has
    the browser installed while my other two computers show that I'm
    running a relay.  If this is nothing to be concerned over then
    that's that but I would like to make sure from possibly the
    friendly people here just in case.  This is what I have as of today:


    May 31 07:35:23.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.27 (git-412e3f7dc9c6c01a)
    opening new log file.
    May 31 09:48:33.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 14 days
    12:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.34 MB and received
    138.42 MB.
    May 31 09:48:33.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 77.895%
    May 31 09:48:33.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 7%
    May 31 12:42:51.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.27 (git-412e3f7dc9c6c01a)
    opening log file.
    May 31 12:42:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to
    directory server.
    May 31 12:42:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 50%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:53.000 [notice] I learned some more directory
    information, but not enough to build a circuit: We need more
    microdescriptors: we have 0/7013, and can only build 0% of likely
    paths. (We have 0% of guards bw, 0% of midpoint bw, and 0% of exit
    bw.)
    May 31 12:42:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 51%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 53%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 54%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 56%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 57%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 59%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 60%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 62%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 63%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 65%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 66%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 68%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 69%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 71%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 72%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 74%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 75%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 77%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 78%: Loading relay
    descriptors.
    May 31 12:42:54.000 [notice] I learned some more directory
    information, but not enough to build a circuit: We need more
    microdescriptors: we have 3220/7013, and can only build 11% of
    likely paths. (We have 48% of guards bw, 48% of midpoint bw, and
    49% of exit bw.)
    May 31 12:42:56.000 [notice] We now have enough directory
    information to build circuits.
    May 31 12:42:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the
    Tor network.
    May 31 12:42:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor
    circuit.
    May 31 12:42:57.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a
    circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
    May 31 12:42:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done.




    May 30 07:35:20.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.4.27 (git-412e3f7dc9c6c01a)
    opening new log file.
    May 30 09:48:33.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 13 days
    12:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.00 MB and received
    128.80 MB.
    May 30 09:48:33.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 78.591%
    May 30 09:48:33.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 7%
    May 30 15:48:33.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 13 days
    18:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.06 MB and received
    130.60 MB.
    May 30 15:48:33.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 78.468%
    May 30 15:48:33.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 7%
    May 30 21:48:33.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 14 days
    0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.19 MB and received
    134.22 MB.
    May 30 21:48:33.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 78.172%
    May 30 21:48:33.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 7%
    May 31 03:48:33.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 14 days
    6:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.25 MB and received
    136.02 MB.
    May 31 03:48:33.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 78.053%
    May 31 03:48:33.000 [notice] TLS write overhead: 7%
    May 31 07:35:23.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup).
    Reloading config and resetting internal state.
    May 31 07:35:23.000 [notice] Read configuration file
    "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc".
    May 31 07:35:23.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".


    On Tue, May 31, 2016 at 2:12 PM, Gumby <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        I am a tech, a good one, who also runs 2 relays from my shop.
        I have found in client PC's many hidden things - such as
        proxys running for malware delivery. They were totally unaware
        except for slow and losing disk space. (Finding Tor running is
        a bit too extreme) I've also had two clients that were
        "absolutely" sure that someone was out to get them -
        cyber-stalking in their eyes. I actually did all of the
        suggestions made prior - new drive, reset or new router, even
        walked the home and perimeter looking for connections. I was
        positive of my security (30 years doing this) but they were
        calm for less than 4 weeks then started again. Their spouses,
        to their credit, stayed quiet and just rolled their eyes.
        Could a malicious technician do this? Hell yeah - most of us
        could do it dozens of times and they'd never know. We have too
        much moral decency, but.... others don't.
        More than likely, it is a scenario as christian states ....
        too much overload somewhere.
           Or a troll, we hope not.

        Me


        On 05/30/2016 04:27 PM, Christian wrote:

            -------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht --------

                Von: Christian Adam <[email protected]
                <mailto:[email protected]>>
                An: [email protected]
                <mailto:[email protected]>
                Betreff: Re: [tor-relays] I'm Running A Tor Exit But
                Never Initiated
                It
                Datum: Mon, 30 May 2016 22:14:51 +0200

                Dear Percy,

                I read all of your messages very carefully and,
                please, believe me, I
                don't mean to be rude, but just want to provide you a
                little bit of
                relief.

                First of all, I have to share that I AM in fact a
                schizophrenic for 16
                years now, but fully therapied to the extent I do a
                job as a system
                administrator and get certified for being a data
                security officer this
                week.
                This won't reveal any competence on my side, but gives
                a clue about my
                functional level which is, after all, related to sanity.

                << snip >>

                Given my experience with newbie users, paranoia and system
                administration, what you wrote seemed quite normal and
                you didn't
                provide (as far as I remember) any unusual technical
                details.

                Maybe what just happened was a lack of informed
                consent resulting in a
                tasteless prank.

                I don't want to do injustice to you, but since Edward
                Snowden, we're all
                used to question every system crash and honestly, our
                times seem to be
                hysterical and violence-saturated.

                The rule is simple. When a user thinks he's infected,
                he's almost always
                not.
                If he's infected, he wouldn't notice.

                Hugs, I hope you find peace again soon.

                Please don't feel offended, I only told my story based
                on the facts you
                gave.

                And kind regards,

                christian


                Am Montag, den 30.05.2016, 13:25 +0200 schrieb
                Christian Pietsch:


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