On 10/05/2016 01:27 AM, teor wrote: > >> On 5 Oct 2016, at 18:10, <[email protected]> <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> We're back to IPS, which can drop the specific malicious traffic. >> I've been speaking with the lawyer few minutes ago. He told me >> that there is a pressure to put all the responsibility for the >> traffic to the ISPs. Well ... what are the ISPs most probably >> going to do ... ? They can ban all tor exit nodes, or they will >> force the owners to clear the traffic. >> >> When you're worried about being accused, why you don't use fake >> information during registration and payments with bitcoins? Then >> you can also filter the traffic by IPS ... and everybory will be >> happy. > > There are a few things wrong with your suggested solution: * it's > really, really hard to stay anonymous on the Internet as an > individual, and impossible for many corporations (it's hard to be > transparent about how you spend money as a charity, and be > anonymous at the same time),
Truth. > * if all Tor Exit Nodes are anonymous, ISPs may block them more, > not less, Yes. But at least there's less risk to exit operators. > * filtering will likely get your Exit marked as a BadExit, Yes, I get that. What happens if it's the hosting provider or their ISP that does the filtering? With end-to-end encryption, of course, it's less effective. But there are some pretty decent protocol detectors. > * IPS aren't perfect - they let some unwanted traffic through, and > block other traffic that is totally ok. That is an issue. But there are many exits, so eventually users should find one that works well enough for their purposes. > Tim > >> >> What should a tor exit op do? Ban the user? exits get the traffic >> from middle nodes and we cant tell (by design) who anyone is. We >> can block ips but that is not really helping with bots who tries >> to find vulnerabilities and scan large blocks. >> >> markus >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> On 4 Oct 2016, at 23:55, <[email protected]> <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> If I understand that well ... if tor operator is avare, that his >> tor node is used for illegal activity (when their ISP told them >> about that) and he's not going to do anything abou that, he wont >> be guity by complicity? >> >> >> On 04.10.16 22:37, [email protected] wrote: >> >>> Tor and IPS has both it's own nature and you shouldn't be >>> punished, if your intension was just to filter the bad >>> traffic. >> >> And who is to decide what constitutes "bad traffic"? I am not a >> lawyer, but in Germany one of the cornerstones of not being held >> responsible for traffic passing through a Tor node is ยง 8 of the >> Telemediengesetz: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/__8.html >> -- sometimes referred to colloquially as the "provider >> privilege". >> >> One only is free of responsibility if one neither initiates a >> transfer, nor selects the transfer's destination, nor selects or >> modifies the transmitted data. That's what "passing through" >> means. >> >> According to two lawyers I spoke to, exit policies might already >> be borderline breaking these rules for exit nodes, but the >> technical basis at least guarantees that traffic will never reach >> an exit node that does not let it pass. Now think of a firewall >> that interferes with transfers once the data has already reached >> the exit node. Wouldn't you agree that this means >> selecting/modifiying the transmitted data? >> >> That's just one national law that I am aware of, I imagine other >> countries have similar regulations in place. Any internet >> service provider interfering with net neutrality risks lawsuits, >> because it is not an ISP's prerogative to decide what traffic is >> "good" or "bad". >> >> -Ralph _______________________________________________ tor-relays >> mailing list [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> = _______________________________________________ tor-relays >> mailing list [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> _______________________________________________ tor-relays >> mailing list [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> _______________________________________________ tor-relays >> mailing list [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > T > > -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) > > teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C > BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject > dot org > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing > list [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
