On 10/05/2016 12:58 PM, Green Dream wrote: > @Mirimir: > > >>> IPS aren't perfect - they let some unwanted traffic through, and >>> block other traffic that is totally ok. > > >> That is an issue. But there are many exits, so eventually users should >> find one that works well enough for their purposes. > > > Re-read what you said and think about this from the user's > perspective. This is a recipe for disaster when it comes to Tor user > experience. Perhaps it seems suitable to you, as a technical person > and a relay operator, but just think about this problem for a barely > technical user, or someone new to Tor. What will actually happen is > people will try Tor, hit a shitty exit with random performance > problems from an IPS, log off and never use Tor again.
True. But increased risk of hitting bad exits is arguably better than having fewer exits. > Tor needs all the help it can get with regards to usability and > reliability. It's gotten better over the years but I still get > circuits that are borderline unusable. Adding a hodgepodge of blocking > IPS systems into the mix isn't going to help this problem. Yes, I do too. And I wouldn't be happy if poorly implemented IPS made exits unpredictably unreliable. On the other hand, IPS that only blocked automated crap would be a win for real users, relay operators and ISPs, no? Why should "... ssh [email protected] ... ssh [email protected] ... ssh [email protected] ..." get through, if it destroys exits? Maybe someone could forget their username. But maybe after 10-20 tries, can't we safely assume that they're brute forcing logins? > No offense to the ISP here (I do think they are within their rights to > take this position), but I think relay/exit operators should find ISPs > that understand Tor and don't demand an IPS. > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
