On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:47 PM, grarpamp <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk >>>> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to >>>> realize that there's nothing useful to them. > >>> This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to >>> create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, >>> waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... >>> then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing >>> found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% >>> of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. >>> Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit >>> ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place. > >> Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country >> which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? > > Depends if hosting country can extradite, or threat influence at > things of value such as bank accounts, travel bans, people, etc. > >> Does it make sense >> to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit? > > If poor odds or afraid of such things, the farther distant > and / or opposite legally, politically, logically and physically > the better. > >> What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous? > > They lose the remaining hosting contract worth of bitcoin, > get the account / card canceled, nym blacklisted, etc. > > > For only running an exit / relay and nothing else... > > Policy / nuisance shutdowns by the hoster do happen > often, nodes just move and redeployed elsewhere. > > Detainer for questioning, are rare, oops, you're free to go. > Raids and confiscation, are rare, and property seems to be returned. > Actual arrests / night in jail / charges, are even rarer, oops you're > free to go.
Unfortunately rarer things happen. The ongoing case in Russia: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/13/tor_loses_a_node_in_russia_after_activists_arrest_in_moscow/ "According to TASS, he’ll be held for two months pending investigation." Recent update on the story: students of MSU petitioning in support of Dmitry Bogatov during a public event in the university were asked to leave the event. The text (in Russian): http://newstes.ru/2017/05/20/studentov-sobiravshih-podpisi-v-podderzhku-matematika-bogatova-vygnali-s-dnya-fizika-v-mgu.html It seems to be the first such severe case in Russia. > Charges that go to court, are extremely rare. > Probably no one has *ever* been convicted that we know of? > > Because only running an exit / relay and nothing else, > seems to be legal everywhere. (If it is illegal somewhere, > then the operator is at fault for breaking that law.) > > And traffic passing through relays seems to have "ISP style" > legal exceptions everywhere, that even cover "torts", so long as > operators are not in business of inspecting or moderating. > > Which is why everything above is marked "rare". > > > If you know of places where... > a) relays themselves are illegal > or > b) ISP style exceptions do not exist > ... you should definitely reply with such a list. > > > Real problems are rare, and running relays is fun :) > > Legal environments typically apply equally so once > you know your environment you can always add other > overlay networks / services / nodes into to the mix > if you're bored or have unused bandwidth in your contract: > I2P, CJDNS, GNUNet, Freenet, Pond, VPNGate, > XMPP / IRC, Remailers, Crypto Currencies, IPFS, etc... > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays -- Best regards, Boris Nagaev _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
