On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 05:30:37PM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote: > Consider another case. Users have often complained that running a tor > relay results in their IP addresses being blocked by all manner of services > around the Internet. The providers of those services say they have suffered > attacks originating from tor relays. The project's response was to create > an automatically, frequently updated list of IP addresses of exit relays and > make that list available for download by anyone wishing to block traffic from > tor exits, while allowing traffic from all other relays. That list of > addresses suffers the same problem of not including alternative IP addresses > for those relays. Even worse, troublesome connections from those alternative > addresses *can* be traced back, in some cases, to the exit relay. Once those > services have identified the offending traffic as coming from a machine they > had been promised by the tor project would be in the downloadable list of > exit relay addresses, they may decide that they had been deceived by the tor > project, which could lead to many bad things in the future.
I think we might have to agree to disagree about a lot of these topics, but I wanted to correct this one. The bulk exit list: https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py along with TorDNSEL is designed to handle exactly this situation, and it does it pretty well. --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
