> Hi relay operators!
Isn't that more relevant to HS operators than relay operators?
> I want to let you know about two upcoming research projects by academic
> research groups. The tl;dr is that they're running relays to do certain
> measurements, and so far as we can tell the proposed methodology is
> safe enough and worthwhile enough, but we invite you (and everybody)
> to evaluate it too.
Do you review the design and implementation or design only?
> In particular, check out cases 2017-02 and 2017-03. They have each
> put up a web page explaining their research project and why it's safe,
> and listing which relays are associated with the research.
Trying to access this page via https times out.
https would be appreciated.
> An adversary compromising $n-1$ HSDir servers
> cannot infer anything about counters or onion addresses.
If you design a system with these properties
shouldn't the ISP also be part of your threat model?
(especially with what we observed lately in FR)
> Again, we run relays controlled by three different entities over two
> with different jurisdictions, so avoid coerced disclosure of data.
Does the stated geo-diversity relate to the entities operating the
measurement nodes or the location of the measurement nodes themselves?
(I guess it is the former)
If the list of fingerprints at http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/
is in fact complete and Maxmind has proper IP-to-AS data for these IPs
than _all_ participating measurement servers are hosted using a
> Experiment Status: OFF
> We are not running our relays and experiments now.
At least the relays seem to be running.
Please publish the timeframe during which you will measure (like
https://onionpop.github.io/ does) so HS operators who want to opt-out
can shutdown their onions during that time if they wish to do so.
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