Roger Dingledine: > Hi relay operators! Isn't that more relevant to HS operators than relay operators?
> I want to let you know about two upcoming research projects by academic > research groups. The tl;dr is that they're running relays to do certain > measurements, and so far as we can tell the proposed methodology is > safe enough and worthwhile enough, but we invite you (and everybody) > to evaluate it too. Do you review the design and implementation or design only? > In particular, check out cases 2017-02 and 2017-03. They have each > put up a web page explaining their research project and why it's safe, > and listing which relays are associated with the research. > http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/ Trying to access this page via https times out. https would be appreciated. http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/safety-board.pdf wrote: > An adversary compromising $n-1$ HSDir servers > cannot infer anything about counters or onion addresses. If you design a system with these properties shouldn't the ISP also be part of your threat model? (especially with what we observed lately in FR) [...] > Again, we run relays controlled by three different entities over two > continents > with different jurisdictions, so avoid coerced disclosure of data. Does the stated geo-diversity relate to the entities operating the measurement nodes or the location of the measurement nodes themselves? (I guess it is the former) If the list of fingerprints at http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/ is in fact complete and Maxmind has proper IP-to-AS data for these IPs than _all_ participating measurement servers are hosted using a _single_ hoster. http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/ wrote: > Experiment Status: OFF > We are not running our relays and experiments now. At least the relays seem to be running. Please publish the timeframe during which you will measure (like https://onionpop.github.io/ does) so HS operators who want to opt-out can shutdown their onions during that time if they wish to do so. -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_ _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
