> On 3 Oct 2017, at 10:57, Roman Mamedov <r...@romanrm.net> wrote: > > On Tue, 3 Oct 2017 09:53:46 -0400 > teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>> For interposing dual-protocoled nodes along the way, how many do there >>> have to be for it to become "not too limiting"? >> >> This is one of the questions we need researchers to answer. > > I can't help but feel you are overcomplicating this. > > Clients create a circuit by randomly picking 3 nodes out of the all-nodes > pile, right? If all 3 happen to be IPv6-capable, then the circuit can go over > IPv6 and all is fine. If some of the 3 happen to be IPv6-only while others are > IPv4-only, the whole selection can be thrown away and repeated. > > That way IPv6-only relays could get some usage on a totally random basis, with > no compromises and no restraining "of the next hop based on the previous one", > not hurting anonymity. Clients just need to know which nodes are IPv4-only, > IPv6-only or dual-stack, to not attempt unworkable combinations, discarding > them instead.
Discarding unworkable combinations and restraining node choices seem equivalent to me, although the relay weights may be different. > And as there are more and more dual-stack or IPv6-only relays, the "throw > away" step will be needed less and less often. If you think this will work and is safe for client anonymity, then the next step is to write a tor proposal. Having a concrete design could help with analysing the anonymity implications as well. I think IPv6-only relays are a lower priority than better IPv6 and dual-stack client support, and IPv6-only bridge support But we could do both in the same release. Tim _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays