On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:41:00AM +0000, nusenu wrote: > > Comment (by arma): > > > > I continue to think that teaching exit relays to avoid allowing exit > > connections to known relays (IP:ORPort) is a good and useful step. > > > > We keep running across messy situations where letting somebody connect to > > a relay from an exit relay's IP address turns into a security surprise. > > Does that mean that exits will no longer be able to run tor clients (ie. to > run apt updates via tor)?
No, they are unrelated. The things you describe would be connections made by the Tor client, and the things I describe would be connections made by building a circuit to the exit and sending a begin cell. (Also, if you want to reply to a trac ticket comment, the strategy of responding on the tor-relays list is a very odd approach. :) --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
