On 08/31/2018 02:51 PM, Matthew Glennon wrote: > Anyone else getting nude photos and random links from Cynthia Coleman < > [email protected]> attached to this (and other thread(s) > lately? Spam obviously, but ugh. > > Matthew Glennon
Sure am ;) Somebody could find the abuse contact and post it :) > Want to make sure only I can read your message? Use PGP! > (Then paste the encrypted text into an email for me to receive!) > https://keybase.io/crazysane/ > https://pgp.key-server.io/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x92E43A8A9EF85EB4 > > > On Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 5:01 PM Conrad Rockenhaus <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Good God every conversation, now. Anyway. >> >> This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor >> though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known >> as balls to those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in >> country such as Turkey, which absolutely hates freedom inducing >> technologies such as Tor. Let’s give this guy (or gal) the atto-boy by >> marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked in >> autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely >> none. They screw with the DNS servers over there, that’s why during the >> last uprising they were tagging “8.8.8.8” on the walls. >> >> Now they’re doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this guy >> gives us a window to see what is blocked and what isn’t blocked within the >> Turkish thunderdome. >> >> -Conrad >> >>> On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective >>> client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful? >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor relays. >>>> Arisbe >>>> >>>> >>>> On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote: >>>> >>>> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in >>>> Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or >> Syria or >>>> Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they >>>> should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir >> flags >>>> too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. >> Don't >>>> risk that! >>>> >>>> Cordially, >>>> Nathaniel Suchy >>>> >>>> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months... >>>>> D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114 >>>>> >>>>> The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its >> upstream >>>>> is >>>>> shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough. >>>>> And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully >>>>> useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / networks. >>>>> >>>>> Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected >>>>> to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, therefore >>>>> such censorship is moot for them. >>>>> >>>>> For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,, >>>>> https://onion.torproject.org/ >>>>> http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/ >>>>> search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc >>>>> >>>>> Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out >>>>> from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit >>>>> may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true >>>>> representation >>>>> of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator action >>>>> even though unintentional / delayed. >>>>> >>>>> Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this, >>>>> so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see... >>>>> https://ooni.torproject.org/ >>>>> >>>>> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country >>>>> >>>>> And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer >>>>> resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes >>>>> around the world. >>>>> >>>>> And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited >>>>> visibility, >>>>> for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either, >>>>> and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed >>>>> exits as well. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM, >>>>> New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes. >>>>> >>>>> They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such >>>>> classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels >>>>> of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others >>>>> can subscribe to them and Exclude at will. >>>>> They can further publish patches to make tor automatically >>>>> read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude >>>>> and route stream requests around just those lists of censored >>>>> destination:exit pairings. >>>>> >>>>> Ref also... >>>>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit >>>>> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact >>>>> the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship. >>>>> >>>>> Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what >>>>> would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream >>>>> to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted... >>>>> >>>>> a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to >>>>> use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your >>>>> blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally >>>>> unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one >>>>> of the others tor has open? >>>>> >>>>> b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net, >>>>> like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit >>>>> or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them? >>>>> >>>>> c) ??? >>>>> >>>>> Or that some large number of topsites were censored via >>>>> singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be >>>>> exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where >>>>> no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance >>>>> is known to exist at the same time. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> tor-relays mailing list >>>>> [email protected] >>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tor-relays mailing [email protected]:// >> lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt. >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> tor-relays mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >>>> >>> -- >>> tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-relays mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
