> There are so many edge cases for this check. > > Flags are a *recommendation* to clients. They don't force clients > to behave a certain way. > > For example: > * clients connecting via bridges can use a middle node as their > second hop. These middle nodes will leak bridge addresses via nyx. > * clients and relays can have different consensuses: > * if a relay loses the Guard flag, and finds out earlier than its clients, > nyx will stop protecting those clients > * if a client finds out before the relay, nyx won't protect those clients > * some Tor client versions don't check the guard flag at all. Others > keep their guards, even if they lose the flag > * middle and exit relays can be used as bridges, even if they don't set > BridgeRelay > * older Tor versions have a non-zero probability of choosing any relay > as an entry, even if it doesn't have the guard flag > * various config options make tor clients ignore the Guard flag > > Please only show an IP if the relay is already public in the consensus.
Thanks teor, great point. Will do: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27475 _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
