Regarding:> And as a trivially simple example, what stops an organization with government level resources from offering $10-$100 (in appropriate currency) to any citizen that adds a newly discovered bridge to their list?
=> It's basically an arms race. If bridges get burned fast, we can re-deploy them fast. I don't have many bridges and they are still used well, but if they were getting flagged fast I'd have no problem to deploy a double-digit number of bridges and change all of their public IPs automatically weekly, daily, hourly or at whatever frequency is needed. You can automatically deploy stuff like that quite easily with any large Cloud provider - preferably with multiple at the same time. They'd need to block entire IP ranges (hitting a significant portion of the internet) or keep fighting our automation with a lot of manual effort. Not sure who would be interested to play this game for an extended period of time. Even government level of funding has to show some kind of effect or the campaign will get shut down sooner or later. Dec 27, 2021, 04:42 by [email protected]: > On 2021-12-22 23:42, Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote: > >> I know it might be a fundamental change to the Tor network, but would it be >> possible to obfuscate the Tor bridge/relay addresses with their respective >> fingerprints; similar, to the I2P network? I've often thought that this >> aspect of the I2P network is one that is implemented well. Perhaps Directory >> Authorities could preform fingerprint to address resolution? I think it >> would be extremely beneficial if neither bridge or relay addresses were >> published in the wild. It would make great strides in further buffering the >> Tor network from various black-listing/censorship techniques. >> > > I guess I'm not sure how this would work, for me as a user, when I launch tor > browser? How do I obtain a bridge or an initial relay? > > And as a trivially simple example, what stops an organization with government > level resources from offering $10-$100 (in appropriate currency) to any > citizen that adds a newly discovered bridge to their list? > > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >
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