Hello, here is the March 2015 report for SponsorR:
- More work was performed on the first hidden service statistics [1]. We now update the original graphs in real time and are hosted on Metrics: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html - Moving onwards with new statistics, we started an analysis of the lifetime of introduction points on a few hidden services (#15513). We hope that this analysis will help us find bugs and better understand Tor's introduction point behavior in general (#4862) - We made progress on the new control port feature that makes it easier for developers to fetch the descriptor of a hidden service (#14847). The code has now been reviewed and is ready to be merged. - To better understand how hidden services publish their descriptors and how the HSDirs cache them, we wrote an in-depth walkthrough on the relevant internals of Tor: https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/volatile/hs-health-desc.txt This analysis brought two possible solutions for #12500 and #13483. It also put things in perspective for the HS health measurer making it clearer to find the contention points for HS reachability. - We wrote a proposal for changing the requirements to become an HSDir, to make it harder for attackers to exploit the HSDir hash ring (#8243): https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-March/008532.html - We formed an "investigation team" to better understand the poor performance of multiple hidden services that were experiencing an abnormal amount of clients. To analyze why the hidden services were overloaded, we stress tested them and filed tickets of various improvements that should be performed: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15463 - We also investigated another potential issue with bandwidth statistics and hidden services (#8742). A user who sets up his hidden service on Tor relay, can get detected by looking at the bandwidth statistics which will be oddly shaped. This problem is now blocked by not allowing relays to be hidden services, but more research needs to be done on other attack vectors from bandwidth statistics. [1]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/some-statistics-about-onions _______________________________________________ tor-reports mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-reports
