George Kadianakis <[email protected]> writes:
> Hello,
>
> here is the October 2015 report for SponsorR:
>
> - The first bunch of hidden service statistics is now enabled by default. The
> feature was enabled in tor-0.2.7.3 and the coverage graphs have already
> climbed slightly: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-reporting.html
>
> The stats enabled are:
> * The total number of unique hidden services:
> Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html
> * The total volume of hidden service traffic on the network:
> Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html
>
> - As part of our larger statistical efforts, we did another security and
> privacy
> evaluation of the above stats to ensure that the obfuscatory noise we are
> adding is indeed completely covering the tracks of individual users.
>
> We performed the evaluation by extracting all the hidden service statistics
> values that were reported by relays over the month of September. Then we
> manually inspected them to see that the noise we are adding is significantly
> affecting the reports of relays. A more detailed analysis can be found here:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:33
>
> We invite people to use or even expand our dataset to evaluate the privacy
> of
> our statistics.
>
> - We also improved on the HSDir health tool that tracks the health of the
> HSDir
> subsystem and the correctness of descriptor uploading by hidden services:
> https://gitlab.com/hs-health/hs-health/blob/master/design.md
>
> You can now see its results updated in real time:
> http://ygzf7uqcusp4ayjs.onion/tor-health/tor-health/index.html
>
> - As part of our efforts to engage the research community, we met with UCL
> researchers and students who have interest in anonymity-related topics like
> hidden services, private statistics, and mixnets. We discussed ideas
> regarding
> guard node security, detecting active end-to-end correlation attacks and
> hidden service scaling techniques.
>
> - To further lubricate the research community, we published a document
> describing the current status of open hidden service proposals. We also
> provided a brief summary for each proposal so that researchers and
> developers
> can get up to date faster:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/torz-dev/2015-October/009762.html2
>
Oops. The link here should have been:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009762.html
Sorry about that!
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