>> That's the reason for which it would be really nice to see tor2web >> concept directly implemented in Tor, in order to support the diffusion >> of anonymous publishing capabilities.
Until anonymity systems become illegal or blocked, any leaker who can surf the net can just as easily run them... and reap the additional protections therein as they see fit. If they are illegal or blocked, your project, that relies on said systems, is dead. > - How would non-Tor users find the set of exits providing the tor2web TorStatus, bridge-publishing-style-ish social nets, etc. > - This would consume exit relay bandwidth which is already constrained. > - These exit operators would be accepting a huge risk of being shut > down ... already blacklists Both are operator choice, presumably governed by their own configurable blacklists. > I don't see why it belongs in Tor itself. Other than being geekily cool to have proxy, CONNECT, bind(2), or general VPN inproxy functions... it doesn't belong, simply because the answer to this question is likely riddled with failure... Whether common carrier will allow you to emit arbitrary data, on demand, from your entrypoint, in an agnostic fashion, that you yourself do not provide? No idea what tor2web is blocking, but I do know I'm amazed they're still online, especially given they appear to be in Atlanta, GA, US. Do we have a statement from them as to how things are working out for them with this? Mail them and ask :) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
