Thanks for your effords, but i think, we are talking about two different things. Of course, TOR does not want to hide that you use it.
My worrys concern the TOR-Relays in Denmark. For example, there are 20-30 Relays running in Denmark, some at home, some in Datacenters. If danish ISPs have to log each 500. Packet, and you accidently use a circuit consisting only in danish Servers (thats not very likely, but it could happen I think), they can track everything you have done using TOR, i think. Is there anything in TOR that does prevent this problem? Actually, I think, that danish law affects only home consumers, no hosting- centers. Do you think there are many, who run TOR-Servers at home using normal customer dsl-connections? On Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:44:03 +0200 Andrew Lewman <[email protected]> wrote: >On Friday, July 15, 2011 10:05:36 AM [email protected] wrote: >> Hello, >> recently I read about the danish law to log every 500. IP- >Packet, >> which is on wire between Customer and ISP. Allthough this Law >> doesnt affect hostet Servers, i thin it is dangerous for Tor- >Relays >> which run on a normal PC at home. >> >> What do you think abou this? If very much Packets from Tor- >Servers >> are logged due this law, are danish-Tor servers now very >unsecure? > >Let's take this apart into some easy to digest pieces. > >First, I belive the law is to record IP packet header information, >not the >contents themselves. While this is bad, it's the basis of traffic >analysis and >exactly one scenario in which Tor can defend the user. In part, >I'm basing my >understanding of this law from >https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Telecommunications_d >ata_retention#Denmark > >The logs of a connection running a non-exit relay or bridge are >going to only >see encrypted traffic to and from the home computer. The logged >packets may >show someone using Tor, but the traffic contained within is still >encrypted. The >connections will between Tor user and Tor relay, and Tor relay to >Tor relay. >Currently, Tor does not try to hide that you are using Tor. Tor >doesn't >scream 'I'm using Tor', but at the same time, if your adversary is >looking >really closely, they can deduce you are using Tor. The good news >is that >we're working on pluggable transports and obfuscating proxies to >hide the fact >that you are using Tor. > >The logs of a connection running an exit relay is going to see >encrypted traffic >from other relays and whatever traffic exited from itself to a >destination. The >logs will record lots of traffic from people other than the ISP >subscriber. >Some small percentage of this data may be illicit, as defined by >local laws. >This is the same risk for exit relays now. > >Other information about protections tor provides against an >adversary >recording your traffic can be found at >https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#Whatprotec >tionsdoesTorprovide > >-- >Andrew >pgp 0x74ED336B >_______________________________________________ >tor-talk mailing list >[email protected] >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
