Hi, Chris wrote (12 Dec 2011 08:35:01 GMT) :
> 1. A user should not have to download a CD from a site every time an > update comes out. What kind of better solution are you thinking of? We've got an incremental upgrade system in the works: https://tails.boum.org/todo/usb_install_and_upgrade/#index5h2 Don't hesitate using the Tails communication channels to suggest improvements etc. > 2. Users should not need to know how to authenticate the download (each > update to TBB or Tails)- while nice users aren't competent enough to do in > practice and the difficult in doing it makes it unlikely even those who > know how may not do it. So we should avoid making the user do the > authentication at all. > That can be done if there is a distribution that is installed. > Authentication of updates is already built into apt. Lets use it. > Install once and forget. I may be missing your point, but Tails is not a random collection of packages that could be individually upgraded without any thought. Tails is a carefully crafted system that aims at guaranteeing certain properties. We do our best to ensure an ISO we ship meets a certain specification. There is simply no possible way for us to ensure the same for "that ISO plus any number of APT upgrades on top of it". Details: https://tails.boum.org/forum/Security_Updates:_apt-get_Sufficient__63__/#comment-ee6b87ae9397f6a9045f6c77fb52272d > 3. Does tails prevent non-Tor communications? I was reading something > which suggested it was an idea. If it is an idea chances are it isn't > implemented. It does. Details: https://tails.boum.org/about/ https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/ Cheers, -- intrigeri <[email protected]> | GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc | OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc | The impossible just takes a bit longer. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
