Hi Andrew, I have read those 2 links. The design I'm thinking of would be resistant to probing attacks presented in the "ten ways to discover bridges" article in that it would modify the bridge protocol to be "semi" public. The basic idea is to perform hand shaking between the bridge and the client in a 3rd party server without delivering information to either of them until it has been established the client can be forwarded to the bridge, which will then be listening for that particular IP.
This method is based on the premise that client certificates can be distributed to individuals on site. It's weakness is for attackers to gain access to a valid client certificate, so this bridge delivery method will be at its highest efficiency if it is used to provide high connectivity to a limited amount of key individuals. I need a couple questions answered before i can proceed further: 1) Can I assume client certificates may be distributed safely to people in hostile zones? 2) Is this the right place to discuss the design in details? _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
