On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 12:21 AM, grarpamp <[email protected]> wrote: >>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the >>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to >>> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked. > >> This doesn't make sense to me. If you've got two requests open from >> the same exit to the same site, using different accounts, then all the >> site can tell is that two Tor users (or maybe one) are connecting to >> it. That's also the same conclusion it could reach if the two >> requests were coming from the same exit. > > Sentence 2 and 3 appear to be the same? > >> Is there a better use case here? > > I think that if I was watching the site logs and userA and userB > continually logged in daily at about the same times from the same > exit, I might infer them to be the same user. I might not even be > aware IP's in logs are multiuser tor/proxy nets. Now add in similar > client app versions, handshakes, account names, headers, settings, > etc... and parameter by parameter the linkage gets stronger, even > without infringing upon content. Keep the exits different and it's > weaker.
Actually, it's stronger! Let's say that there are 50 accounts that all log in to my site over Tor. Let's say that there are N tor exits, and let's pretend that each exit is chosen with probability 1/N. If anonAccountA and anonAccountB are run by different users, I'd expect them to use the same exit 1/N of the times that they both log in. But if, over time, I see that anonAccountA and anonAccountB both sometimes use some of the same exits, but they never use the same exit at the same time, I can conclude that they are run by the same user, and that user has enabled some kind of exit isolation option. -- Nick _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
