-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 06/10/12 22:28, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
>> The basic idea being that your keys are shifted from RAM into >> the debug registers of the CPU on boot, then all future crypto is >> done directly on the CPU (AES-NI) without the keys re-entering >> RAM. > > Did you check that the volume key (shown with cryptsetup luksDump > --dump-master-key) is not stored in RAM by cryptsetup or by the > kernel anyway? I just tested with aes-xts-plain64, and the key > appears in QEMU's memory dump in 3 locations after the encrypted > volume is mounted. From: http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresorfiles/tresor.pdf "TRESOR is only compatible with real hardware. Run- ning TRESOR as guest inside a virtual machine is gen- erally insecure as the guest?s registers are stored in the host?s main memory." This is a serious project. They have considered many different styles of attack, and have included attack code. The PDF is comprehensive. - -- Mike Cardwell https://grepular.com/ http://cardwellit.com/ OpenPGP Key 35BC AF1D 3AA2 1F84 3DC3 B0CF 70A5 F512 0018 461F XMPP OTR Key 8924 B06A 7917 AAF3 DBB1 BF1B 295C 3C78 3EF1 46B4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGGBAEBCgBwBQJQcKZEMBSAAAAAACAAB3ByZWZlcnJlZC1lbWFpbC1lbmNvZGlu Z0BwZ3AuY29tcGdwbWltZTgUgAAAAAAVABpwa2EtYWRkcmVzc0BnbnVwZy5vcmdt aWtlLmNhcmR3ZWxsQGdyZXB1bGFyLmNvbQAKCRCdJiMBwdHnBM1fB/wMgj0FrrDw ZbeF+dsxdRqd2plHavwTRs7xbe+RZJbAWiH1aYDEhzGv4PPFMmrsyWogOz1SZ4/W qLnLiqfsCd9f3orS6gvMpD1cyqeJ7poFTW2QLMEWGKS1SYMMIvFOfrpjyP1zrF9q 0IxvAUXsV6xG/Q38piRTEqbx2zipTG9VvogskopkHDS13V0xl4wBTx+7AWHATaoi Va4Gp2vWnyPdGyB+GQ3SIlYbWf6PRsxLXHhV5kIb5d2y6NvEbnPgM42Tt3IxSjw4 Gdol8CoV9hklPhjWsnYjXzDuhmesLkyUSzob2k/JH0mX17N3A6PvdcyGzfUlmbOe 0gU1WYxX+p+t =Rxbl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
