Gregory Maxwell: > On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 9:45 AM, adrelanos <[email protected]> wrote: >> Seems like high latency mix networks failed already in practice. [1] >> >> Can't we somehow get confidence even against a global active adversary >> for low latency networks? Someone start a founding campaign? > > So have low latency ones, some things fail. Today you'd answer that > concern by running your high latency mix network over tor (or > integrated into tor) and so it cannot be worse. Answering the "you > need users first, and low latency networks are easier to get users > for" concern. > > The point there remains that if you're assuming a (near) global > adversary doing timing attacks you cannot resist them effectively > using a low latency network. Once you've taken that as your threat > model you can wax all you want about how low latency mix networks get > more users and so on.. it's irrelevant because they're really not > secure against that threat model. (Not that high latency ones are > automatically secure either— but they have a fighting chance)
Are you really sure the fight is 100% lost and there is no way to deal with global active adversaries for low latency networks? See: "Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication" [1] Sounds quite good, doesn't it? Why isn't this path perused any further? Sounds promising, doesn't it? [1] http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/node/28 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
