On Sun, Sep 08, 2013 at 11:47:06AM -0400, Nathan Suchy wrote: > Would my traffic still be secure? >
To do what, and secure against whom and to what degree? It is reasonable to assume that if NSA is running Tor nodes, then they are probably using good operational security. So against someone breaking into those nodes and then attacking you, you are probably more secure than using random nodes. (But see below.) If you mean secure against the NSA node operators, then no. Any adversary that owns all the nodes in your route should be able to learn pretty much everything about your traffic patterns, who you're talking to and when. This is true for the NSA or anybody else. If you mean intentionally selecting some subset of nodes because you trust them more or because you are trying to avoid them as adversary nodes, there is a tradeoff between the potential better security that might provide and what your choice might reveal about you. cf. "Trust-based Anonymous Communication: Adversary Models and Routing Algorithms". There's currently research advances but no simple advice on that score. This all assumes adversaries just live at the nodes rather than also at the ISPs, the ASes, the IXPs, etc. It is hard to say anything more about such an adversary without more details. You might want to see "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor By Realistic Adversaries" and some of the earlier work on this issue cited therein. HTH, Paul -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
