Kostas Jakeliunas <[email protected]> wrote:
>Hi all, > >has there been any discussion/research whether Tor bridges are more likely >to get blacklisted in censored areas if they'd been first run as simple >internal relays? The idea being, if a censorship system is fishing for Tor >nodes so they can be blacklisted on a per-IP-address basis and an internal >relay later on becomes a bridge but is using the same external IP address, >I suppose it is possible that it might get automatically blacklisted. Say >I'm a censor and I'm blacklisting all IPs found in the published >consensuses. I discover that someone is trying to connect to an IP >previously found on a consensus (and I recall all previous IPs) - I do not >do DPI - and simply block the connection due to IP address match. In this >case, it doesn't matter if the bridge could be found via bridgeDB, or if >it's doing pluggable transports. Any known cases/reports where this is >likely to have happened? > >The reason I'm asking is, I've been running an internal Tor relay and am >considering making it to be an obfsproxy bridge; it would be the same IP >address. Perhaps this is inefficient, i.e. it is likely to have already >been blacklisted in many censored/important areas? I suppose it's also an >interesting question in itself, and it would be interesting to do some >experiments e.g. using OONI. > >Thanks for any input >Kostas. >_______________________________________________ >tor-talk mailing list >[email protected] >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
