Agree completely, and there are other security reasons--not to mention NoScript configuration defaults--that also potentially favor 1) signature-based verification of all TBB components at launch, 2) potentially encouraging users to consider multiple TBB installations to support/encourage compartmentalization, and especially 3) improved user education on the importance of using new identities, e.g. prominently informing users via check.torproject.org.
Even just the javascript-mediated privacy violations that are possible via the use of tabs (no Private Tab extension!) in TBB are pretty astonishing. > ----- Forwarded message from Watson Ladd <[email protected]> ----- > > Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 19:13:26 -0700 > From: Watson Ladd <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Subject: [tor-talk] What the NSA cares about getting and defenses > Message-ID: > <cacsn0cn1mguwf7wyynhn1mnw8swwqm3r+xx9wmhnd+ipmya...@mail.gmail.com> > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Prompted by the Ars Technica reporting on QUANTUM, I took a look at the > slide and read the text, as well as compared to the MULLINIZE document > describing NAT breaking. My conclusion is that the NSA obtains significant > amounts of information from user activity in between closing browsers, and > that current Tor Browser Bundle remains vulnerable to this attack. > > QUANTUM appears to rely on inserting fake references to third party assets > and manipulating cookies in the requests made by the browser in response. > I > propose that we block third party cookies unless over HTTPS to mitigate > this problem, and try to encourage users to use more frequent new > identities. > > MULLINIZE achieves the reliable tracking of individual users behind a NAT > through similar tricks. It is clear that the NSA views this information as > valuable, even without real-world addresses to tie to it. Linkability > across pages is difficult: breaking sessions is a major cost of the > obvious > no cookies approach to preventing this sort of attack. > > Sincerely, > Watson > -- > tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] > To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > > ----- End forwarded message ----- > -- > Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org";>leitl</a> http://leitl.org > ______________________________________________________________ > ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org > AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5 > -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
