On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Seth David Schoen <[email protected]> wrote: > ... > You could use BGP redirection to become able to spy on traffic > headed to a guard node or coming out of an exit node that would > otherwise not have passed through networks that you control. > The most relevant consequence of that would probably be increasing > the probability that the attacker can successfully do a traffic > correlation or confirmation attack.
active attacks, of various types, are also clearly possible. the impact of these varied, but possibly significant. i recommend all relay ops sign up for cyclops alerts for suspicious BGP behavior on their netblocks: http://cyclops.cs.ucla.edu/ it's a bit noisy, but useful. best regards, -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
