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> The circuit-layer crypto (which happens under the TLS layer) > should still provide significant protection for user communications > over Tor. But a MITM attack of this kind could still help traffic > analysis, and likely other unexpected badness as well. Will the Torproject - or more specifically the directory authorities again blacklist affected relays (in this case only until they upgraded) after the majority upgraded? Has anyone done any measurements to determine how many relays are running a vulnerable openssl version? Did anyone run Adam Langley's check script against the tor consensus yet? https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/binary/earlyccs_check.go -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTlEEcAAoJEDcK3SCCSvoeZ3wP/iaNxPSc9vG0ccsC61UFdtVK 2VN+CQLwTwpV2ZNnQwjKKFfUcKE/Wf8VUyjwUlRfy0RRmO/Lk/o009WpI50YQUgk 5HAxYiqGUkaPSwAb2OQASDs1q1qL6W0tK784s1A5VUWdKP4WDbs8fg8t/idoqHvn uvGLxczKkuKzfIS/KW6Er3aV3gLJlK+MCAFgKEC8RMlXdka04Y1NWrKhd9Lt9ycw XiO8Zf51X2KyqMswSUJZNukGEFS0JO97LFgKCEx9TEXVFnhZFQ1Y2vG0KZfZDARx PwI8o6L1faBoIurEC2M3tT3N3lSguw9CzhvSKyG5JVi80pz/FemPyLmWKty7v3D7 WR8KW/hB1dsSg0BbUuqZMWdVeoJUur0Z6YLdyFBaaZPb/fyi13z3jYLzle/Kt8e4 G/OBOM/Ziagvks1f+wcLufKue3RfGZRcPfSEl6h2TbEtE+xrHRrsR9Cl47t/3Qyv WrJuLJ3VWGUoeEPvaj69vvwMmxbw2W9T8qEi1ZnWaTmmibYuUWC4NowCuhPe9K4l aD5+aMAMQtFDlR6YstS3ewb/QPY7cURUQldQkxqlhfC+uHJ4Cc0WhmrSZJIbvXC2 BJEKYQWgzP0kTxQJ1qpZHLNXJZp29rHMy51jQ9y5KkJBwD/VDN3yFuRRhTgfJeKi YDYhvYcuvlqSt64fI++D =DQf8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
