So assuming that people here https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget are serious and do a "straight-forward", yet clever passive-observer attack on Users; Given that they are listening *really* well and knowingly manage to become Guard + Exit of Users in order to deanonymize them:
1. What would help (and not change any other anonymity-parameters)? When my guard goes offline, don't "ever" pick it as guard again? servers can change quickly, so probably not... 2. Would some kind of "web-noise" generation in Torbrowser help? like so https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/white-noise-generator 3. Will the content of that talk be publicly available? 4. Tails does not remember guards right? Is that really the safest way you know (for now)? 5. Everything can be mobile now. Maybe such https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-October/025975.html location-aware guards should become the default? thanks -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
