On Sat, Jun 28, 2014, at 10:38 PM, [email protected] wrote: > I recently read a Guardian article from last October > (www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-cnsa-users-online-anonymity) > > by Bruce Schneier about the N_S_A and Tor. His story was based on the > "Tor Stinks" and "Egotistical Giraffe" presentations. > > My understanding of the article is that if individual(s) are requesting > http://www.target_website.com then, once the request leaves the exit > node, the N_S_A can use their Quantum servers on the Internet's > backbones to redirect the request to their FoxAcid servers in order to > compromise the requester. > > I don't understand what Schneier means by this: > > "After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA uses > its network of secret internet servers to redirect those users to > another set of secret internet servers, with the codename FoxAcid, to > infect the user's computer." > > Surely the whole point of Tor is that the requester of > http://www.target_website.com cannot be identified based on the traffic > which leaves the exit node. Since the N_S_A would only know the IP > address of the exit node and the destination > http://www.target_website.com, how can the client be identified even if > the traffic is redirected to the FoxAcid servers?
They are identified as a person of interest by visiting target_website.com (where target_website.com might be an 'extremist' site or a webmail box that has attracted attention) and then *in real time* code injection and redirection can be used to attack the person's computer. So 'identifying an individual Tor user' means 'identifying as a person of interest, new or previously encountered but not yet traced'. GD -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Email service worth paying for. Try it for free -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
