On Fri, 29 Aug 2014 18:59:19 -0600
Mirimir <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 08/29/2014 01:55 AM, John Doe wrote:
> > Surely this is not as simple as that which you said. Why have even a
> > middle node if it is only the first and last nodes that count? I
> > cannot believe this is a simple thing of the first and last nodes
> > giving people up.
>
> Some do use just entry guard and exit relay, for lower latency.
>
> Even the NSA, with global intercepts, is apparently not doing
> full-network traffic correlation among Tor relays.
And you know that how, exactly?
> Maybe they will
> after Bluffdale is fully functional.
>
Or maybe not...? Because, maybe, the idea hasn't crossed their
minds? Or?
> But Sybil attacks are clearly feasible, and require just some cloud
> servers and the skills to use them. See Johnson et al. (2013).[0] It
> seems that Sybil attacks against Tor are limited in scale not so much
> by an adversary's resources, but rather through oversight by Tor
> Project staff. Even though Tor is an open network, relays that behave
> suspiciously get evicted.
>
> [0] Johnson et al. (2013) Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor
> by Realistic Adversaries.
> http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
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