Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't CERT contract out to federal agencies sometimes? -- Greg Norcie ([email protected]) PhD Student, Security Informatics Indiana University
On 1/21/15 5:59 PM, Mirimir wrote: > OK, so this is very interesting: > > | The court documents refer to a source that provided "reliable > | IP addresses" for Tor hidden services between January and July > | of 2014, leading them back to both the servers and 78 different > | people doing business on the site. > | > | According to a Tor blog post, someone during that period was > | infiltrating the network by offering new relays, then altering > | the traffic subtly so as to weaken Tor's anonymity protections. > | By attacking the system from within, they were able to trace > | traffic across the network, effectively following the server > | traffic back to their home IP. In July, Tor noticed the bug and > | published an update to fix it — but for six months, certain > | hidden services were badly exposed, and the Silk Road 2 appears > | to have been one of them. > | > || OK, almost certain: CERT Tor deanon attack was FBI source: > || https://t.co/JKwWD2E3VK SR2 server, 78 vendor IPs, Jan-July 2014 > || — Nicholas Weaver (@ncweaver) January 21, 2015 > | > | So who carried out the attack? Already, researchers are pointing > | to a Black Hat presentation this summer that promised to outline > | a similar attack, but was controversially cancelled at the last > | minute. The researchers, working for CMU's CERT Center described > | similar capabilities and performed their research over a nearly > | identical span of time: January to July of 2014. If the > | researchers were also helping the FBI investigate criminal > | activity on Tor, it would explain why law enforcement might > | not want their methods getting out to the community at large. > > https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/21/7867471/fbi-found-silk-road-2-tor-anonymity-hack > -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
