Relating to passive analysis, link/path padding, and crypto. See the relavent threads in archive for further context. http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> Date: Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 6:34 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC? To: <[email protected]> If folks wanted to work on that RFC angle, I'd be delighted to help out as I can. I think that traffic analysis mitigation is the next big area we need to start trying hard to work. So far, we've (IETF) gotten general padding capabilities added to protocols (HTTP/2.0 for example, still in discussion for TLS1.3) on a case by case basis, but we've not yet done anything systematic. I'd love to see a WG chartered to try figure out how to most effectively counter traffic analysis and then go write protocol and/or BCPs as needed. (Speaking personally of course, it'd require IETF consensus for that to happen obviously.) Pragmatically, it's very late for a BoF to happen at the March IETF in Dallas. Deadline is Feb 6 for requests which are mostly far more developed than one single email:-) But if someone wanted to speak to the topic, we still have space/time available in the agenda for the security area meeting in Dallas. Ping me if you're interested and willing and able to work on that. Cheers, S. -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
