Oskar Wendel writes: > Seth David Schoen <sch...@eff.org>: > > > As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because > > the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection, > > even without knowing the complete path. > > Is it possible to be sure that one of these connecting clients is in fact > a client and not just intermediate relay in the circuit?
As a guard node (or someone observing a guard node) trying to locate the operator of a hidden service, you can use the IP address of the inbound connection and the Tor directory to see if it's another Tor node or not. I guess the hidden service operator could use a bridge to create more ambiguity about what's happening; I don't know for sure if a guard node has a way to distinguish an inbound connection from a bridge from an inbound connection directly from a client. -- Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk