On 03/04/2016 01:39 PM, Scfith Rise up wrote: > It _would_ be the same private key. Good luck with generating 1.2 > septillion permutations (16^32).
That's not what I get from https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/HiddenServiceNames. SHA1 collisions are possible. > But could be doable in a few years so to answer your question, I > believe there can only be one published in the HSDIR, so first come > first served. Facebook's would have to be DDOS / shutdown and then > the forged one can be spun up and published. As I understand it, what matters is which one announced most recently. > Please correct me if I'm wrong as I've only been researching Tor since 2015. > >> On Mar 4, 2016, at 3:23 PM, Mirimir <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 03/04/2016 01:03 PM, Andreas Krey wrote: >>>> On Fri, 04 Mar 2016 19:55:01 +0000, Flipchan wrote: >>>> IF i generate a .onion domain , isnt there a risk that someone can >>>> generate the same domain? I mean anyone can generate .onion domains and IF >>>> i got an easy .onion address then some could easily generate that rsa key >>>> right? >>> >>> There is no 'easy' onion address, only ones that look like they >>> are. Faking facebookcorewwwi takes the same effort as any other. >>> Getting an onion that starts with facebook but does not end in >>> corewwwi is much easier (by the factor 1099511627775), but that >>> is true for any other eight character prefix as well. >>> >>> Andreas >> >> OK, but let's say that someone got facebookcorewwwi.onion, running >> scallion on some mega-GPU monster. It's hugely improbable, I know. And >> they'd have a different private key, of course. But how would Tor handle >> that? Would it work like running multiple onion copies does now? That >> is, would they compete for HSDir priority? >> -- >> tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] >> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
